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A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis of the Hungarian, Polish and
Lithuanian Presidencies and European Union
Eastern Partnership Policies
BRUNO VANDECASTEELE, FABIENNE BOSSUYT & JAN ORBIE
Centre for EU Studies, University of Ghent, Belgium
ABSTRACT This article analyses and compares the influence of the Hungarian, Polish and
Lithuanian Presidencies of the Council of the European Union (taking place between 2011 and
2013) on the Union’s policies towards the countries of the Eastern Partnership – Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The influence of the Presidencies is
compared through qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), which aims to identify necessary and
sufficient conditions for influence to occur. The results show that there is only one necessary
condition for the Presidency to exert influence, that is, the issue should be highly salient to the
incumbent Member State. The absence of any other condition for influence does as such not
hamper Presidency influence. Moreover, the analysis reveals three sufficient combinations of
conditions for Presidency influence, in which the individual conditions play different roles. The
application of QCA to Presidency influence leads to novel insights and stimulates conceptual
clarity on the level of and the conditions for influence.
KEY WORDS: Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Presidency of the Council of the EU, inﬂuence, qualitative
comparative analysis
Introduction
The question whether the Member States of the European Union (EU) can exert additional
influence on EU decision-making when holding the rotating Council Presidency (herein-
after: Presidency) has inspired a lively academic debate in the past decades. While some
have argued that the Member States do not use their Presidency position to increase
their influence (Dewost, 1984; Ludlow, 1993; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006; Vida,
2010; Culley et al., 2011), others have shown that Member States holding the Presidency
do exert additional influence during their term at the helm (Arter, 2000; Bjurulf, 2001;
Tallberg, 2004; Schalk et al., 2007; Warntjen, 2007; Thomson, 2008; Bunse, 2009).
Several instruments for exerting influence have been identified, such as issue decoupling
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(subtraction) or coupling (package deals), compromise proposals, additional meetings
(Warntjen, 2013b) and different forms of agenda shaping (Tallberg, 2003).
The evidence on Presidency influence is increasingly well documented and theoretically
informed, and a large number of conditions affecting Presidency influence have been ident-
ified (see infra). However, it is still unclear if and how these conditions can jointly
strengthen or limit Presidency influence. This is the underlying research puzzle of this
article: it addresses the question which conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for a
Presidency to exert influence through a study of the Hungarian, Polish (both 2011) and
Lithuanian (2013) Presidencies and their influence on the EU’s Eastern Partnership1
(EaP) policies. The main rationale behind this research question is that the three Presiden-
cies exerted influence to varying degrees in different policy areas; the aim is to explain
which conditions contributed to influence in terms of necessity and sufficiency.
The empirical focus of the article is based on three considerations. The first two are
initial scope conditions: the article focuses on (i) external policies in which the Presidency
can play a role and on (ii) a geographical area in which the Presidencies are to a certain
extent interested to play a role. Indeed, the EaP policies first of all constitute an area of
EU external policies in which the Presidency is potentially influential: contrary to
‘classic’ foreign policy, in which the EU’s High Representative and the European External
Action Service (EEAS) play an important role, EaP policies cover a broad range of external
policy areas where the Presidency has key responsibilities at different stages of policy-
making, that is, in certain working parties, in Coreper and during ministerial meetings.
Second, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania are interested in further integration between the
EU and (some of) its Eastern neighbouring countries. Earlier research suggests that Presi-
dency periods are opportunities for Member States to promote their views on external pol-
icies and to steer political attention in the EU to specific regions (for Central and Eastern
EU members, see, e.g. Tulmets, 2011). It can thus be expected that these three Presidencies
will at least try to influence some aspects of EaP policies. The third consideration for case
selection is that the influence of the Presidency on external policies has received rather little
attention in the academic literature compared to other policy domains, and existing research
on this topic (Arter, 2000; Tallberg, 2006b; Bunse, 2009; Dijkstra, 2011) discusses cases
pre-dating 2009, that is, before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Since this treaty
changed the role of the Presidency (Charléty & Mangenot, 2011; Craig, 2011;
Vanhoonacker et al., 2011; Warntjen, 2013a), especially in external policies, research on
Presidency influence in this renewed institutional setting contributes to understanding
current decision-making processes in the EU.
Presidency influence is explored through fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
(fsQCA), which allows us to make systematic analyses of sufficient and necessary con-
ditions for influence. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a set-theoretic method
that works with membership scores of cases in sets (i.e. ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ of a con-
dition or an outcome), perceives relations between social phenomena as set relations, and
interprets these set relations in terms of sufficiency and necessity (for recent overviews on
QCA, see Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). As explained in the
appendix to this article, ‘influence’ is defined here as intentionally changing a policy
from what it would have been in the absence of an action. The degree of political influence
(PI) of an actor is expressed as a function of the actor’s goal achievement, the extent to
which this goal achievement can be ascribed to the actor and the political relevance of
the output.
2 B. Vandecasteele et al.
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The empirical data used in this article are drawn from extensive desk- and field research,
including analyses of official documents from the EU institutions and the Member States,
secondary sources such as academic and news articles, and 81 in-depth interviews with
officials of EU Member States and institutions between January 2012 and August 2014.
Due to space constraints, these data are not elaborated in the main body of the article;
detailed descriptions of the data on influence of the Presidencies are available in three
online country files, and information on the operationalization of concepts can be found
in the appendix to this article.
With this article, we aim to make an empirical and a methodological contribution to the
literature on Presidency influence. Empirically, the article summarizes and analyses a large
amount of data on the role and influence of three Presidencies in shaping the EU’s relations
with its Eastern neighbours (see Supplemental data 1–3, which is available from the
article’s Taylor & Francis Online page at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2015.
1039248). Methodologically, it is the first systematic comparison of Presidency influence
with QCA, a method that – in distinguishing between necessary and sufficient conditions –
enhances debates on the conditions for (Presidency) influence.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: the next section gives an overview
of the conditions for influence. Subsequently, we briefly discuss the benefits and chal-
lenges of applying QCA in this article, and then provide a summary of the policy areas
in which – and to what extent – the Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies did
and did not exert influence. This is followed by a summary of the empirical data for this
article, including information on the extent to which the conditions for influence apply
to the respective Presidencies. The last part of the article discusses and interprets the
results of the comparison with QCA. The conclusion summarizes these results and
makes a few suggestions of topics for future research.
Conditions for Inﬂuence
A large number of conditions for Presidency influence have been identified in the literature
(for an overview, see, e.g. Vandecasteele & Bossuyt, 2014), however, without clear indi-
cations on possible conjunctural causality. With this article, we aim to provide a systematic
analysis of the necessity and sufficiency of (combinations of) these conditions with the
Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies as an empirical basis. This section summar-
izes the conditions for influence, including the abbreviations that will be used in the tables
for fsQCA. Detailed information on operationalization of these conditions is available in
the appendix.
The conditions for influence can be divided into three groups (see also Van Hecke &
Bursens, 2011, p. 25): country-specific conditions, conditions related to policy areas or
specific issues, and conditions related to the external context.
Among the country-specific conditions, adequate preparation (‘prep’) is expected to
contribute to Presidency influence (Arter, 2000; Bunse, 2009). It involves efficient plan-
ning, staff training and careful formulation of priorities. Adequate preparation ensures
that the Presidency is ready for expected and even unexpected developments in the EU
that the procedures and informal rules are applied routinely, and that dossiers can be ident-
ified where progress (or delay if so wished) are possible. The planning should consider the
political calendar of the EU and of world politics, such as elections in key Member States,
important summits and multilateral events.
A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 3
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Second, the division of labour between the permanent representation (permrep) and the
national capital is discussed in the literature as affecting Presidency influence. Bunse
(2009) argues that Presidencies allowing large autonomy to the permrep are more influen-
tial than strictly capital-based ones. The argument is that Brussels-based officials know best
where the sensitivities lie and which compromises are feasible. The degree of ‘Brussels-
based Presidency’ (in fsQCA: ‘bru’) can differ between policy areas, depending on
issues such as the internal organization of administrations, the importance of the topic or
the availability of expertise.
A third country-specific condition is the reputation (‘reput’) of the incumbent Member
State (Metcalfe, 1998; Bjurulf, 2001; Baun, 2009; Bunse, 2009). Incumbent countries with
a good reputation enjoy more trust among the other Member States and the EU institutions,
which makes influence on decisions more likely. For this article, ‘good reputation’ is con-
ceptualized along three dimensions (on reputation, see Quaglia & Moxon-Browne, 2006;
Bunse, 2009; Jakobsen, 2009): (i) the incumbent country is considered to give the ‘right
example’ in domestic policies, (ii) the political leadership of a country displays a positive
attitude towards European integration and (iii) the Presidency invests in soft knowledge of
chairpersons. Giving the ‘right example’ at home means that domestic policies correspond
to what is generally accepted by the other Member States and the EU institutions. A posi-
tive attitude towards European integration refers to the absence of hostility towards (one or
several aspects of) European integration (Crespy & Verschueren, 2009). Such hostility
would lessen trust of the other Member States and EU institutions (Leconte, 2012), thus
reducing the Presidency’s ability to exert influence. The third dimension, soft knowledge,2
includes negotiation, managerial and organizational skills, experience in multicultural
environments, rhetoric, teamwork, stress control, transparent planning, clear communi-
cation, effective use of the available rooms and networking (see, e.g. Bjurulf, 2001;
Bunse, 2009; Kajnc,̌ 2009; Vanhoonacker et al., 2010; Karoliewski & Sus, 2011).
Fourth, the role of size of the incumbent country is to be tested: the literature is as yet
inconclusive on how size contributes to influence. Several authors (Bjurulf, 2001;
Bengtsson, 2002; Kajnc ̌ & Svetlicǐc,̌ 2010) argue that a Member State’s size does not
affect its ability to manage practical issues. However, large countries (in fsQCA: ‘large’)
are generally supposed to be more influential in the Council than smaller ones (Tallberg,
2008) and, in external policies, large States function more autonomously than small States
and thus have more room for manoeuvre (Dijkstra, 2011). However, others (Baillie, 1998;
Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006; Björkdahl, 2008) point out that small States can use the Presi-
dency to increase their influence on decision-making in the EU, since they are usually not
expected to (be able to) push their interests in the same way as large States do (Vanhoonacker
et al., 2010). In any case, it is unclear whether small States have more or less influence than
large States during their Presidency (Warntjen, 2007).
A fifth country-specific condition to be considered is the effect of a stable domestic pol-
itical and administrative context (‘stab.dom’): effective intra- and inter-departmental
coordination (Baun, 2009; Bunse, 2009, p. 64) and a stable Government with a strong
mandate (Copsey & Pomorska, 2010) can be expected to increase the influence of a
Member State, especially during a Presidency period. It is argued that, in a stable domestic
situation, the incumbent country can concentrate on the Presidency’s agenda and goals and
does not have to direct resources to internal coordination.
In addition to these country-specific conditions, two conditions related to specific policy
areas will be considered.3 First, salience of a policy area to the Presidency (‘sal.pres’)
4 B. Vandecasteele et al.
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refers to the importance of the area and the willingness of the incumbent country to spend
resources (time, staff, funds) in order to achieve its goals in this area. High salience gen-
erally motivates the development and mobilization of hard knowledge among a country’s
civil servants and politicians, which results in a higher potential for influence. In turn, low
salience entails little hard knowledge (Schalk et al., 2007; Warntjen, 2007). This condition
has been used in bargaining models for studying legislative decision-making in the EU (see
also Thomson & Stokman, 2006). In our view, the effect of this condition (i.e. more atten-
tion for the topic, more hard knowledge) can be equally important in decision-making on
external policies. ‘Salience’ as a condition for influence should not be confused with ‘pol-
itical relevance’ as an indicator for PI (see Appendix). ‘Salience’ refers to the importance of
an issue for an actor or the intensity of its preferences regarding a policy area. The salience
of an issue to the Presidency is assessed from two types of sources: the Presidency
programme, on the one hand, and in-depth interviews and secondary sources, on the
other. The latter sources provide insights into the salience of unexpected events and of
issues that were not included or under/overemphasized in the Presidency programme.4
In turn, ‘political importance’ is a measure for the relevance of an issue for the relations
between the EU and EaP countries, including the political importance of the issue (i.e.
its political and symbolic value) for EU-EaP relations, as well as the novelty and tangibility
of the policy development. The sources for assessing political relevance are not drawn from
Presidency-related data. Instead, the degree of political relevance is established through an
assessment of the researcher-based official documents and secondary literature.
Second, a favourable distribution of preferences and salience among other actors
(Member States, institutions) (in fsQCA: ‘fav.pref/sal.oth’) affects the extent to which
the Presidency can influence EU policies. The effects of heterogeneity of preferences
and salience to the other actors are two different things that partially interact with each
other, and can therefore be formulated as one condition. The lower the salience of a
policy area to the other actors, the more room for manoeuvre they may give to the chair
and vice versa (Bjurulf, 2001; Bunse, 2009). At the same time, some authors (Fernández
Pasarín, 2009; Bursens & Van Hecke, 2011) argue that the incumbent country can
realize its national preferences only if there is a certain degree of homogeneity between
the agendas of the Presidency and other actors in the EU. If there is too large a ‘mismatch’
between agendas, it is less likely that the Presidency will achieve its goals. This condition
will not be considered separately in the online country files: the distribution of EaP-related
preferences and salience among the actors in the EU was generally stable in 2011–13.
There was a consensus that the region ‘matters’, but points of view diverged on the inten-
sity, scope, underlying principles and finality of EU-EaP cooperation. As explained in the
next section, we have defined eight policy areas on which the Presidencies did or did not
exert PI. In some policy areas, the distribution of preferences and salience among other
actors is considered ‘rather favourable’ (0.67), while in other areas, this is ‘rather unfavour-
able’ (0.33) (Interview 3, 10, 11, 12; Vaïsse et al., 2013). The former group includes
cooperation on education and research, youth, trade and economy, and transport. The
latter group consists of politically sensitive issues, topics that directly affect national inter-
ests and policies involving considerable funds: bilateral political relations, defence, energy,
justice and home affairs (JHA, especially mobility of persons and human rights) and the
multilateral institutional framework for cooperation.
Finally, two context-related conditions broadly shape the environment in which the Pre-
sidency operates. The external political context (Baun, 2009), or leadership environment
A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 5
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(Bunse, 2009), is constituted by the political climate in the EU with regard to the topics of
interest to the Presidency (e.g. the context of relations with candidate countries is different
from that for neighbouring countries of the EU), domestic politics in EU countries or global
events (e.g. election campaigns in key Member States or on-going multilateral negotiations
that could distract attention for the topics the Presidency wants to emphasize), and unex-
pected events or crises (e.g. natural or man-made disasters that can jeopardize the Presi-
dency programme) (see, e.g. Vos & Bailleul, 2002; Langdal & von Sydow, 2009). A
‘favourable external political context’ is abbreviated as ‘fav.ext’.
Also, the European economic context (see, e.g. Baun, 2009) may affect the Presidency’s
influence, especially if the incumbent country has high ambitions for new or enhanced
policies. Economic decline can lead to less support within the EU for reforms or new com-
mitments, while in periods of economic prosperity, EU Member States are more open to
new initiatives (Pintelon & Van Lancker, 2011). At the same time, periods of economic
crisis, if skilfully handled, can provide a window of opportunity to the Presidency to initiate
reforms and steer policies in line with its preferences.
Applying QCA for Analysing Inﬂuence: Beneﬁts and Challenges
In this article, we apply the fuzzy-set variant of QCA and its homonymous software
package fsQCA, which allows us to analyse differences in kind and differences in
degree: membership scores of the conditions and the outcome range between 0 and
1. We manually assign the membership scores to conditions and outcomes, based on theor-
etical arguments. Full details on operationalization of influence and the conditions for
influence are provided in the appendix.
In systematically comparing the influence of different Presidencies, QCA provides three
important benefits (see, e.g. Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). First, because QCA is able to deal
with high causal complexity, it has the potential to identify combinations of conditions that
jointly produce an outcome. Second, QCA is an ideal comparative method in a small- to
medium-N research design. Third, the assessment of necessity and sufficiency yields
more fine-tuned results than most other comparative methods, and allows us to exclude
causal conditions that are unnecessary or that are not part of sufficient causal paths.
QCA also poses two challenges. First, the use of numbers and scores to describe set
membership may create a false impression of precision, for example, that 0.60 is exactly
twice as much as 0.30. This is not how the numbers should be interpreted: the scores rep-
resent verbal assessments on an ordinal, not on an interval scale. 0.30 means ‘rather no
member’ of a set (below the threshold value for membership of 0.50), whereas 0.60 is
‘rather a member’ (above 0.50). These numbers translate verbal assessments and should
also be interpreted as such.
The second challenge is related to the number of cases for each Presidency. It would be
inadequate to treat all EaP-related outputs – that is, all EaP-related policy developments,
including issues that were placed on the agenda, decisions that were taken or the
absence of such anticipated developments – as separate cases: the online country files
show that there were more EaP-related outputs to be considered for the Polish and Lithua-
nian Presidencies than for the Hungarian Presidency. Although Hungary exerted influence
on less outputs than the other two Presidencies, it was influential in a relatively higher
number of outputs when compared to the total number of EaP-related events during its Pre-
sidency. Due to the formula used for calculating sufficiency with QCA, this would lead to a
6 B. Vandecasteele et al.
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disproportionate importance of the results concerning Hungary, even though Hungary was
the least interested in the EaP region and it exerted the least influence among the three Pre-
sidencies in this study. For this reason, the cases for comparison are established in two
steps: first, the degree of Presidency influence is calculated for each output per Presidency
according to the principles outlined infra. Second, the outputs are grouped for each Presi-
dency into equal numbers of ‘policy areas’5 on which the EU cooperates with the EaP
countries. These policy areas will serve as the ‘cases’ for analysis: bilateral political
relations, defence, education/research/youth, energy, JHA (including customs
cooperation), multilateral political and institutional framework (including formats for mul-
tilateral cooperation and EaP Summits), trade/economic relations and transport
cooperation.
The membership score for influence in a policy area is represented by the maximum
score of the outputs in this policy area. If, for example, the Presidency was influential
on two outputs (e.g. with scores of 0.56 and 0.67) in the area of transport, and not influen-
tial on three other outputs in this area (say, with scores of 0.00, 0.33 and 0.44), the member-
ship score for ‘influential Presidency’ is set at 0.67 in transport cooperation. The reasoning
behind this way of calculating Presidency influence is the following: when looking back to
a Presidency and asking whether it exerted influence in a certain policy area, one will cer-
tainly answer ‘yes’ if there was at least one output on which the Presidency exerted influ-
ence, even if on ten other outputs it did not exert influence. We are aware of the fact that this
reduces the possible variation on the outcome: lower degrees of influence in a policy area
can be ‘hidden’ behind outputs where influence was higher. However, grouping the outputs
in policy areas is necessary to make the data comparable with QCA. In addition, this
approach best fits our definition of influence, that is, changing a policy from what it
would have been in the absence of an action. In other words, if an actor can change one
part of a policy, it is safe to say that this actor changed the policy. Tables 1–3 provide infor-
mation of the individual outputs for each policy area, so this information is not ‘lost’ for the
reader.
Summary of Inﬂuence of the Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian Council
Presidencies
As noted supra, a detailed description of the data on the three Presidencies would not be
feasible within the scope of this article. An elaborate overview of the data for each Presi-
dency is available in the online country files (see Supplemental data 1–3 online). A
summary of the data is provided here in three tables. Tables 1–3 show the EaP-related
outputs, grouped in policy areas (i.e. ‘cases’ in this article) for the Hungarian, Polish
and Lithuanian Presidencies. The left column shows the policy areas, including the
number of instances where the Presidencies were influential and not influential. The two
columns in the middle summarize the outputs where the Presidencies were and were not
influential, including the degree of influence between brackets. The right column shows
the general level of PI for each policy area.
Table 4 summarizes all data for the three Presidencies per policy area, including the
membership scores for the country-specific, issue-specific and context-related conditions
for influence and the information on Presidency influence. The information in this table
is the basis for the QCA on necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the Presidency to
influence. The policy areas are ranked from high to low influence.
A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 7
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Table 1. Influence of the Hungarian Presidency
Policy area for cooperation with the EaP
countries (number of instances inﬂuential;
number of instances not inﬂuential) Outputs inﬂuential Outputs not inﬂuential
Inﬂuence level for
the policy area
Bilateral political relations (1; 0) • Belarus: sanctions (0.56) 0.56
Defence (0; 0) 0.00
Education/research/youth (0; 0) 0.00
Energy (1; 1) • External energy priorities (partly EaP-
related) (0.67)
• Trans-Caspian gas pipeline: discussions
on negotiation mandate for European
Commission (partly EaP-related) (0.44)
0.67 (partly EaP-
related)
JHA (1; 1) • Belarus, visa facilitation and
readmission agreements: negotiation
mandate for European Commission
(0.56)
• Customs cooperation: high-level seminar
(0.00)
0.56
Multilateral political and institutional
framework (2; 1)
• Establishment of EUSDR (partly EaP-
related) (0.67)
• EaP Summit (0.00) 0.67 (partly EaP-
related)
• Söderköping process: integration in
platform 1 (0.56)
Trade/economic relations (2; 1) • Ukraine: negotiations on DCFTA (0.56)
• Moldova: extension of trade preferences
(0.56)
• EaP Business Forum (0.00) 0.56
Transport (1; 0) • Moldova, Common Aviation Area
Agreement: European Commission
negotiation mandate (0.56)
0.56
Notes: DCFTA, deep and comprehensive free trade area; EUSDR, EU strategy for the Danube region.
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Table 2. Influence of the Polish Presidency
Policy area for cooperation with
the EaP countries (number of
instances inﬂuential; number of
instances not inﬂuential) Outputs inﬂuential Outputs not inﬂuential
Inﬂuence level for
the policy area
Bilateral political relations (1; 0) • Ukraine, Association Agreement: common understanding
about contents (0.56)
0.56
Defence (0; 0) 0.00
Education/research/youth (0; 1) • Education: ministerial
conference (0.00)
0.00
Energy (2; 0) • Trans-Caspian gas pipeline: negotiation mandate for
European Commission (partly EaP-related) (0.56)
• Council conclusions on external energy priorities (partly
EaP-related) (0.56)
0.56 (partly EaP-
related)
JHA (3; 3) • Armenia, visa facilitation and readmission agreements:
negotiation mandate for European Commission (0.78)
• Azerbaijan, visa facilitation and readmission agreements:
negotiation mandate for European Commission (0.78)
• JHA Council conclusions (0.56)
• Police training: Euro-East
training programme (0.00)
• Drug-related crime: expert
meeting (0.00)
• Customs cooperation: high-
level seminar (0.00)
0.78
Multilateral political and
institutional framework (1; 2)
• Establishment of European Endowment for Democracy
(partly EaP-related) (0.89)
• CORLEAP inaugural meeting
(0.00)
• EaP Summit (0.44)
0.89 (partly EaP-
related)
Trade/economic relations (2; 2) • Moldova, DCFTA: negotiation mandate for European
Commission (0.56)
• Georgia, DCFTA: negotiation mandate for European
Commission (0.56)
• EaP Business Forum (0.00)
• Economy: ministerial
conference (0.00)
0.56
Transport (2; 0) • Ministerial conference of Transport Ministers (0.67)
• Azerbaijan, Common Aviation Area Agreement: European
Commission negotiation mandate (0.56)
0.67
Note: CORLEAP, conference of regional and local authorities for the Eastern partnership.
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Table 3. Influence of the Lithuanian Presidency
Policy area for cooperation with the
EaP countries (number of
instances inﬂuential; number of
instances not inﬂuential) Outputs inﬂuential Outputs not inﬂuential
Inﬂuence level for
the policy area
Bilateral political relations (0; 4) • Armenia, Association Agreement: failure
to initial (0.00)
• Georgia, Association Agreement:
initialling (0.00)
• Moldova, Association Agreement:
initialling (0.00)
• Ukraine, Association Agreement: failure
to sign (0.00)
0.00
Defence (1; 5) • High-level seminar on EU-EaP defence
cooperation (0.56)
• European Council Conclusions on
defence (0.00)
• ESDC training course with EaP
representatives (0.00)
• Informal EU Defence Ministers’ meeting
(0.00)
• Informal EU Security Policy Directors’
meeting (0.00)
• Georgia, initialling of CSDP Framework
Participation Agreement (0.00)
0.56
Education/research/youth (2; 1) • Education, science and research conference
(0.67)
• EaP Youth Forum (0.67)
• Launch of Erasmus+ (0.00) 0.67
Energy (1; 1) • Council report on external energy priorities
(partly EaP-related) (0.56)
• Meeting of strategic group for
international energy cooperation (0.00)
0.56 (partly EaP-
related)
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JHA (4; 3) • JHA ministerial meeting (0.78)
• CEPOL annual Presidency conference with
EaP representatives (0.67)
• Belarus, visa facilitation and readmission
agreement: start of negotiations (0.56)
• Moldova, visa liberalization (0.56)
• Azerbaijan, visa facilitation agreement:
signature (0.00)
• Customs cooperation: high-level seminar
(0.00)
• European Judicial Network: plenary
meeting (0.00)
0.78
Multilateral political and
institutional framework (0; 4)
• EaP Summit: invitations to countries
instead of speciﬁc people (0.00)
• EaP Summit: results (0.00)
• CORLEAP annual meeting (0.00)
• EU-EaP Foreign Ministers’ meeting
(0.00)
0.00
Trade/economic relations (1; 2) • Ukraine, DCFTA: provisional application
(0.56)
• EaP Business Forum (0.00)
• Moldova: opening of market for wines
(0.00)
0.56
Transport (1; 1) • Ministerial meeting of Transport Ministers
(0.89)
• Ukraine: air services agreement (0.00) 0.89
Notes: CEPOL, European Police College; CSDP, Common Security and Defence Policy; ESDC, European Security and Defence College.
A
F
uzzy-Set
Q
ualitative
C
om
parative
A
nalysis
11
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
B
r
u
n
o
 
V
a
n
d
e
c
a
s
t
e
e
l
e
]
 
a
t
 
1
2
:
0
3
 
2
2
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
5
 
Table 4. Summary of data for the Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies
Case prep bru reput large
stab.
dom
fav.
ext
econ.
prosp
sal.
pres
fav.pref/
sal.oth
Inﬂuential
Presidency
PL-multilateral political and institutional framework 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.89
LT-transport 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.89
PL-JHA 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.78
LT-JHA 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.78
H-energy 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.67
H-multilateral political and institutional framework 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.67
PL-transport 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67
LT-education/research/youth 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67
H-bilateral political relations 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.56
H-JHA 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.56
H-trade/economic relations 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.56
H-transport 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.56
PL-bilateral political relations 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.56
PL-energy 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.56
PL-trade/economic relations 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.56
LT-defence 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.56
LT-energy 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.56
LT-trade/economic relations 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.56
H-defence 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00
H-education/research/youth 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00
PL-defence 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00
PL-education/research/youth 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.00
LT-bilateral political relations 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00
LT-multilateral political and institutional framework 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00
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A first observation based on Table 4 is that there is a lack of variation on four conditions.
Membership scores for prep and stab.dom are all above the threshold of 0.50, whereas
scores for fav.ext and econ.prosp are below 0.50. In other words, the Presidencies were
rather well prepared (Hungary) or well prepared (Poland, Lithuania) and the domestic pol-
itical and administrative context was rather stable (Poland) or stable (Hungary, Lithuania).
In addition, the external political context was rather unfavourable (Hungary, Poland) to
unfavourable (Lithuania), and the membership score for economic prosperity was 0.00
for all Presidencies. These four conditions will be excluded from the analysis since they
could lead to paradoxical conclusions with QCA (e.g. an unfavourable economic context
is necessary for the Presidency to be influential and to be not influential). The conditions
are treated as further scope conditions for this article: the conclusions apply to Presidencies
of domestically stable countries that are generally well prepared. In addition, these data do
not allow making statements about the impact of context-related conditions: the results
apply to Presidencies taking place in an unfavourable external political context and in a
period of economic crisis.
QCA Results and Discussion
One Necessary Condition: No Inﬂuence Without Salience to the Presidency6
Using a threshold of 0.90, the analysis shows that one condition is necessary for a Presidency
to exert influence: sal.pres (consistency = 0.903614), an issue-specific condition. This means
that the incumbent country cannot use its role to increase its overall influence in the EU. The
Presidency position does not automatically result in higher influence in the EU. Only in
highly salient policy areas, where officials of the incumbent country are prepared to put
specific efforts, can the Presidency increase its influence on EU decision-making.
The fact that salience to the Presidency is necessary for the Presidency to exert influence
is not so surprising, especially because we view influence as the result of a deliberate inter-
vention. What is more striking is that salience to the Presidency is the only necessary con-
dition. All other conditions we investigated, including all country-specific ones, are
individually not necessary. In other words, if, except salience to the Presidency, any of
the conditions under consideration is absent, the Presidency can still exert influence if
some other conditions are fulfilled. Small State Presidencies, countries with a bad repu-
tation, or Member States who organize their Presidency in a capital-based way, can still
exert influence if some other conditions are fulfilled. Presidency influence is also some-
times possible in policy areas where the distribution of preferences and salience among
other actors is unfavourable.
Sufﬁcient Conditions: Causal Combinations Enabling Presidency Inﬂuence7
The analysis of sufficient conditions is based on a truth table, summarizing all causal paths
leading and not leading to Presidency influence (see Table 5).
Based on the data in this truth table, we define a consistency threshold of 0.80: there is a
clear gap between the fifth and sixth causal paths (consistency = 0.845381 and 0.724382,
respectively). In what follows, we summarize the results of the analysis with fsQCA. In the
fsQCA software, membership in a set (condition) is expressed by the abbreviation of this
condition (e.g. large country = ‘large’), non-membership is expressed by the abbreviation
A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 13
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preceded by ‘∼’ (e.g. small country = ‘∼large’). The logical AND is shown as ‘*’, the
logical OR as ‘+’.
The truth table analysis produces three solution terms that lead to ‘influential Presidency’
and indicates which cases correspond to these solution terms:
. sal.pres*bru*∼reput*∼large (consistency = 0.917910). Cases with greater than 0.5
membership in this solution term: H-Energy, H-Multilateral political and institutional
framework, H-Bilateral political relations, H-Trade and economic relations.
. sal.pres*∼bru*reput*large (consistency = 0.883598). Cases with greater than 0.5 mem-
bership in this solution term: PL-JHA, PL-multilateral political and institutional frame-
work, PL-transport, PL-bilateral political relations, PL-energy, PL-trade and economic
relations.
. sal.pres*∼bru*reput*fav.pref/sal.ot (consistency = 0.848181). Cases with greater than
0.5 membership in this solution term: LT-transport, LT-education/research/youth,
LT-trade and economic relations, PL-transport, PL-trade and economic relations.
The first solution term (sal.pres*bru*∼reput*∼large), applying to outputs in EaP policies
during the Hungarian Presidency, can be interpreted as follows: the incumbent country can
be influential in areas that are highly salient to its Government, even if it does not have a
good reputation. The fact that much of the Hungarian Presidency was Brussels-based may
explain this: all interviewees agreed that the civil servants working for the Hungarian Presi-
dency, especially those at the permrep, were highly competent and respected. Apparently,
the country’s rather small size did not prevent its officials from exerting influence in some dos-
siers. Hungarian interviewees noted that their country’s size even had its advantages: bureau-
cratic chains were short, which allowed quick consultation and decision-making (Interview 1,
2, 4, 5). It is interesting to observe that the distribution of preferences and salience among the
other actors does not seem to play an important role here. However, it must be noted that some
crucial outputs in policy areas where this distribution was unfavourable – namely external
energy policy priorities and the establishment of a strategy for the Danube Region – were
only partly related to the EaP (see Supplemental data 1 online).
The second solution term (sal.pres*∼bru*reput*large) includes a number of EaP-related
outputs during the Polish Presidency. It means that the Presidency can also be influential on
highly salient issues that are mainly managed from the capital. Additional conditions are
Table 5. Truth table for ‘influential Presidency’
bru reput large sal.pres fav.pref/sal.ot Number of cases Inﬂuential pre Consistency
1 0 0 1 0 3 0.952991
1 0 0 1 1 1 0.933735
0 1 1 1 1 2 0.897912
0 1 1 1 0 4 0.889780
0 1 0 1 1 3 0.845381
0 1 0 1 0 5 0.724382
1 0 0 0 1 2 0.582707
1 0 0 0 0 2 0.582707
0 1 1 0 1 1 0.442953
0 1 1 0 0 1 0.442953
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that the country should have a good reputation and be large. In other words, a large country
with a good reputation can afford not to base its Presidency in Brussels, without decreasing
its capacity to exert influence. Also for this group of cases, we can see that ‘favourable distri-
bution of preferences and salience among the other actors’ is not part of the solution term; it
covers cases where preferences and salience were distributed rather favourably (transport, trade
and economic relations) as well cases where this was not the case (JHA, bilateral relations, the
multilateral framework and energy – keeping in mind that the outputs in the latter policy areas
were also only partly related to the EaP). In other words, it does not matter whether preferences
and salience are favourably or unfavourably distributed in this solution term.
The third solution term (sal.pres*∼bru*reput*fav.pref/sal.ot) includes several EaP-
related policy developments during the Polish and the Lithuanian Presidencies. It shows
that there is another sufficient combination of conditions under which Presidencies can
influence highly salient policies that are mainly managed from the capital. Countries
with a good reputation can exert influence in policy areas on which there is a (rather)
favourable distribution of preferences and salience among the EU institutions and the
other Member States. Indeed, this solution term covers only instances of Polish and Lithua-
nian influence in politically less sensitive policy areas: transport, education/research/youth,
and trade and economic relations.
Given that the second and third solution terms are very similar, they can be merged into
one solution term: sal.pres*∼bru*reput*(large+fav.pref/sal.ot). Bluntly stated, ‘large
country’ and ‘favourable distribution of preferences and salience among the other actors’
are replaceable conditions in this solution term.
Conclusion
The systematic comparison of the influence of the Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian Pre-
sidencies on the EU’s EaP policies allows us to draw a number of general conclusions on
necessity and sufficiency: most conditions for influence that were identified in the literature
do not always need to be present (necessity), and individually they do not lead to influence
(sufficiency). With QCA, we singled out the (combinations of) conditions that did and did
not contribute to the influence of the respective Presidencies.
Only one individual condition is necessary, that is, salience to the Presidency. Further-
more, Presidency influence is also possible if some of the other conditions are absent.
Apparently, a Presidency can be influential if it has a rather bad reputation (cf.
Hungary) or if the distribution of preferences and salience among the other actors is
unfavourable (cf. some cases of Hungary and Poland). Being large or small as such is
not necessary for exerting influence either, and an influential Presidency is not always
Brussels-based (cf. some cases of Poland and Lithuania).
An important observation on sufficiency is that all conditions we investigated appear in
one or more of the three solution terms, but they do never have to be all present or absent in
order to enable Presidency influence. For the Hungarian Presidency, its Brussels-based
organization of EaP policies seems to be an important explanatory factor that compensated
for the rather bad reputation of the country: EaP-related dossiers were mainly dealt with by
Brussels-based officials who were largely praised for the way they organized the Presi-
dency. Poland benefited in some policy areas from its good reputation and its capacities
as a large State. In other, less sensitive policy areas, Poland and Lithuania took advantage
of their good reputation and of the fact that the distribution of preferences and salience
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among other actors was rather favourable. In the second and third solution terms – which
include ‘high salience to the Presidency’, ‘not Brussels-based’ and ‘good reputation’ – the
conditions ‘large country’ and ‘favourable distribution of preferences and salience among
other actors’ are mutually interchangeable. In other words, where the distribution of sal-
ience and preferences was rather unfavourable, Poland had an advantage (large State)
that Lithuania did not have. We can conclude that the contribution of each of the conditions
for influence depends on the presence of other conditions, and some conditions can become
redundant in some causal paths.
The application of QCA is thus far unique to the study of influence of Council Presi-
dency. It contributes to the opening up of the debate on the circumstances under which Pre-
sidencies can exert influence. The calibration of influence and the conditions for influence
requires maximum transparency on the meaning of concepts, which also benefits the con-
ceptual basis on which influence is researched.
It must be noted that, even though the analyses in this article are based on as many data as
possible, the empirical basis is limited for two reasons. First, we encountered several con-
ditions – preparation, domestic political and administrative context, political context and
economic context – on which there was not enough variation to draw meaningful con-
clusions. The applicability of the research results is thus limited to (relatively) well-pre-
pared Presidencies of Member States that are characterized by a (relatively) stable
political and administrative context, taking place in an unfavourable political and economic
environment. Second, the role of certain combinations of conditions could not be analysed
because they were not represented in the cases. For example, what would be the influence
of non-Brussels-based Presidencies with a bad reputation, or Brussels-based Presidencies
with a good reputation? Would a large and Brussels-based Presidency have more influence
than a small and Brussels-based Presidency?
To sum up, with QCA, we were able to single out (combinations of) conditions that did and
did not play a role for the Presidencies in this study, allowing us to reflect on complex causal
processes underlying Presidency influence. However, based on these results, we cannot draw
up a model that would be applicable to all Presidencies; the results from QCA only allow for
modest generalization (see, e.g. Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009), that is, they should be applicable
to other cases if they share a reasonable number of scope conditions. Future research, focusing
Presidencies to which the conditions for influence apply in more diverse ways, could further
fine-tune and develop the insights that can be drawn from this analysis.
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Notes
1 The EaP, part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, is a framework for multilateral and bilateral cooperation
between the EU and its Eastern neighbours: Belarus (participating only in the multilateral track), Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
2 A detailed discussion of soft vs. hard knowledge is provided in the appendix.
3 Two other conditions related to policy areas and specific issues will not be discussed: the voting method (Elg-
ström, 2006; Tallberg, 2006a; Warntjen, 2007; Bunse, 2009) and the stage in the decision-making process
(Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004; Tallberg, 2006b; Schalk et al., 2007; Thomson, 2008; Warntjen, 2008). These con-
ditions have been studied in relation to EU legislation, but they are less applicable to – mostly non-legislative –
EaP policies.
4 It should be noted that some issues may be included for other reasons than salience (legal obligations, input from
other Member States or the EU institutions, nearly finalized dossiers that the Presidency wishes to close in order
to claim credit), or underemphasized in order not to be viewed as biased or because little progress on the issue is
expected.
5 In the analysis, only the policy areas in which at least one of the Presidencies was influential will be con-
sidered. As a consequence, cooperation with the EaP on issues like agriculture support for civil society
cooperation is not included in the analysis. None of the Presidencies exerted influence in these areas,
despite some events taking place during the different semesters. Also, outputs where Presidency influence
is theoretically impossible will not be considered. Examples of such outputs are those where the incumbent
country is not involved as a host, organizer or chair (e.g. activities of other EU institutions), or if PI of any
actor is impossible (e.g. Cooperation Council meetings, who take stock of bilateral relations but do not
decide on policy).
6 A condition is necessary if it is a superset of the outcome, that is, if the condition must be present for the outcome
to occur. For a necessary condition, its membership score is consistently higher than or equal to the membership
score in the outcome. The formula for necessity of condition X for outcome Y is∑min(Xi, Yi)/∑(Yi). ‘min’ refers
to the selection of the lower of the two values Xi or Yi.
7 Conditions are sufficient for the outcome if they are a subset of the outcome, that is, if the outcome is
present as soon as the conditions are present. A combination of conditions is considered sufficient if the
membership scores in causal paths are consistently lower than or equal to the membership scores of
these cases in the outcome. The formula for sufficiency of causal path X for outcome Y is ∑min(Xi, Yi)/
∑(Xi).
8 Along with some ‘traditional’ ways of operationalizing size (see infra), other operationalizations have been pro-
posed in the literature as well (Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006; Drulák & Šabic,̌ 2010; Buchet de Neuilly, 2011).
Since these overlap with other conditions for Presidency influence, these operationalizations are not applied in
this article.
9 The ranking of Member States according to size based on population, voting weight, the Shapley Shubik Index
(Bolus, 2010) or the Banzhaf Index (Bailer, 2006) are nearly identical.
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Appendix. Deﬁning and operationalizing (conditions for) Presidency inﬂuence
The Outcome: An Inﬂuential Presidency
The definition of ‘influential Presidency’ – the outcome to be analysed across the cases – and the method for
measuring influence are based on an approach that was used in other studies on Presidency influence (Vandecas-
teele et al., 2013; Vandecasteele, 2014). Exerting PI is understood as intentionally changing a policy from what it
would have been in the absence of an action. The degree of PI is established for every EaP-related output during
the respective Presidencies, according to a method that was initially developed by Arts and Verschuren (1999). PI
is a function of three indicators: the degree of goal achievement (GA), the extent to which GA can be ascribed to
the presidency (AS) and the political relevance (PR) of the output. Table A1 shows how GA, AS and PR are oper-
ationalized. PI is calculated in two steps. First, a number between 0 and 3 is assigned to GA, AS and PR: 0 = none,
1 = limited, 2 = substantial, 3 = high. Second, the degree of PI is expressed as the average of GA, AS and PR: the
scores of the three indicators are summed up and divided by 9, which results in a score between 0 and 1. Thus, the
formula for calculating PI is (GA +AS + PR)/9, resulting in ten possible values: 0, 0.11, 0.22, 0.33, 0.44, 0.56,
0.67, 0.78, 0.89 and 1. The PI scores can be reformulated in verbal categories. All scores below 0.50 equate to
‘no influence’ since they are below the 0.5 threshold; 0.56 indicates ‘limited influence’; 0.67 and 0.78 show ‘sub-
stantial influence’; and 0.89 and 1 are expressions of ‘high influence’. The formula for PI is further specified on
two points. First, a score of 0 for GA, AS or PR automatically results in PI = 0: if an actor did not achieve its goals,
the output cannot be ascribed to the actor, or the output was politically irrelevant, it would be unjustified to claim
that this actor influenced a policy. Consequently, PI scores of 0.11 and 0.22 do not occur in practice. Second, AS is
assigned particular weight in the formula, given that this represents a key element of our definition of influence.
The level of PI cannot be higher than the level of AS: if AS is limited (a score of 1), PI cannot be higher than
limited (0.56); if AS is substantial (a score of 2), PI cannot be higher than substantial (0.78).
The method for establishing the influence of the Presidency differs from the one that was used in other studies
(Warntjen, 2008 and Schalk et al., 2007 look at the distance between the Presidency’s preferred outcome and the
actual outcome, compared to what can be expected on the basis of the country characteristics). We believe that the
method based on the work of Arts and Verschuren (1999) most accurately captures the different aspects of influ-
ence in a policy area, notably by including a measurement for political relevance.
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The Conditions for Inﬂuence
In calibrating set membership for the conditions for influence, we define four possible scores: absent/non-member
(0.00), rather absent/more out than in (0.33), rather present/more in than out (0.67) and present/full member (1.00).
The operationalization of these conditions for influence is provided in the following paragraphs and summarized in
Table A2.
For ‘adequate preparation’, 0.00 = none of the following: clear formulation of priorities, adequate staff training,
efficient general planning; 0.33 = one of the aforementioned; 0.67 = two of the aforementioned; 1.00 = all com-
ponents of adequate preparation.
‘Brussels-based Presidency’ is operationalized as follows: 0.00 = none of the following: priorities are devel-
oped jointly by the permrep and the capital, the permrep staff has relative autonomy vis-à-vis the capital in for-
mulating compromise proposals and most chairs of working parties that meet regularly reside in Brussels; 0.33
= one of the aforementioned; 0.67 = two of the aforementioned; 1.00 = all components of a Brussels-based
Presidency.
The reputation of a Member State’s officials can of course differ between individual chairpersons. In this
article, we capture the reputation in one number. As discussed supra, reputation depends on whether the
Member State is considered to give the ‘right example’ in domestic policies, whether the political leadership of
a country has a positive attitude towards European integration, and whether it invests in the soft knowledge of
its chairpersons. This third dimension, soft knowledge, is a type of ‘expertise’. We follow the argument of
Kajnc ̌ and Svetlicǐc ̌ (2010) that ‘expertise’ refers to both hard and soft knowledge. Since these types of knowledge
do not necessarily coincide, we avoid using the term ‘expertise’ in the article. Hard knowledge is knowledge on
‘why’ and ‘what’ questions: dossiers, procedures, facts, history. The level of hard knowledge among civil servants
usually corresponds to the degree of interest of a country’s leadership in a certain topic, and will therefore not be
Table A1. Operationalization of Presidency influence
Indicator Level Description
Goal achievement (GA) 0 The output entirely contradicts the Presidency’s preferences
1 The output partly contradicts the Presidency’s preferences
2 The output does not contradict the Presidency’s preferences,
but is not its most preferred result
3 The output reﬂects the Presidency’s preferences as much as was
legally and practically feasible
Ascription of goal
achievement (AS)
0 The Presidency was not involved as a chair (in this case, the
output is irrelevant for the analysis), or was involved as a
chair but had no role in developing the output
1 The Presidency was involved as a chair to a limited extent, but
the output was mainly developed by other actors
2 The Presidency was involved as a chair and steered the output,
but other actors also played a major role in developing the
output
3 The Presidency was involved as a chair and it is unlikely that
the output would have been the same if another country held
the Presidency
Political relevance (PR) 0 The output is of little or no political importance, is not novel
among EU policies and is not tangible
1 The output is politically important or novel among EU policies,
but is not tangible
2 The output is tangible, but of limited political importance and
novelty among EU policies
3 The output is tangible and politically important or novel among
EU policies
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Table A2. Operationalization of conditions for influence
Condition Absent (0.00) Rather absent (0.33) Rather present (0.67) Present (1.00)
Country-
speciﬁc
Adequate
preparation
None of the following: clear
formulation of priorities,
adequate staff training,
efﬁcient planning
One of the following: clear
formulation of priorities,
adequate staff training,
efﬁcient planning
Two of the following: clear
formulation of priorities,
adequate staff training,
efﬁcient planning
Clear formulation of
priorities, adequate staff
training, and efﬁcient
planning
Brussels-based
Presidency
None of the following:
priorities are developed
jointly by the permrep and
the capital, the permrep
staff has relative autonomy
vis-à-vis the capital in
formulating compromise
proposals, and most chairs
of working parties that meet
regularly reside in Brussels
One of the following:
priorities are developed
jointly by the permrep and
the capital, the permrep
staff has relative autonomy
vis-à-vis the capital in
formulating compromise
proposals, most chairs of
working parties that meet
regularly reside in Brussels
Two of the following:
priorities are developed
jointly by the permrep and
the capital, the permrep
staff has relative autonomy
vis-à-vis the capital in
formulating compromise
proposals, most chairs of
working parties that meet
regularly reside in Brussels
Priorities are developed
jointly by the permrep
and the capital, the
permrep staff has relative
autonomy vis-à-vis the
capital in formulating
compromise proposals,
and most chairs of
working parties that meet
regularly reside in
Brussels
Good reputation None of the following: ‘right
example’ at home, positive
attitude to European
integration, Presidency
invests in soft knowledge of
chairpersons
One of the following: ‘right
example’ at home, positive
attitude to European
integration, Presidency
invests in soft knowledge of
chairpersons
Two of the following: ‘right
example’ at home, positive
attitude to European
integration, Presidency
invests in soft knowledge of
chairpersons
‘Right example’ at home,
positive attitude to
European integration and
Presidency invests in soft
knowledge of
chairpersons
Large country Less than half the average
(less than 9 million)
Between half the average and
the average (more than 9,
less than 18 million)
Between the average and
twice the average (from 18
to 36 million)
More than twice the average
(more than 36 million)
Stable domestic
political and
administrative
context
None of the following:
efﬁcient coordination
between and within State
services, strong support for
the Government, no
national or important
regional elections during
Presidency period
One of the following: efﬁcient
coordination between and
within State services,
strong support for the
Government, no national or
important regional elections
during Presidency period
Two of the following:
efﬁcient coordination
between and within State
services, strong support for
the Government, no
national or important
regional elections during
Presidency period
Efﬁcient coordination
between and within State
services, strong support
for the Government, no
national or important
regional elections during
Presidency period
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Issue-
speciﬁc
High salience to the
Presidency
The issue is not explicitly
mentioned in the
Presidency programme, and
interviewees and secondary
sources reveal that the issue
is not important to the
Presidency
The issue is explicitly
mentioned in the
Presidency programme, but
interviewees and secondary
sources reveal that the issue
is not important to the
Presidency
The issue is not explicitly
mentioned in the
Presidency programme, but
interviewees and secondary
sources reveal that the issue
is important to the
Presidency
The issue is explicitly
mentioned in the
Presidency programme
(except for unexpected
events), and interviewees
and secondary sources
reveal that the issue is
important to the
Presidency
Favourable
distribution of
preferences and
salience among
other actors
The other actors hold
homogeneous positions,
not corresponding to the
Presidency’s preferences
The other actors hold
heterogeneous positions
and the policy area is highly
salient to them
The other actors hold
heterogeneous positions
and the policy area is of low
salience to them
The other actors hold
homogeneous positions,
corresponding to the
Presidency’s preferences
External Favourable external
political context
None of the following: a
positive political climate
regarding the topics of
interest to the Presidency,
absence of domestic events
in EU countries or global
developments that divert
attention from the topics of
interest to the Presidency,
and absence of unexpected
events or crises
One of the following: a
positive political climate
regarding the topics of
interest to the Presidency,
absence of domestic events
in EU countries or global
developments that divert
attention from the topics of
interest to the Presidency,
or absence of unexpected
events or crises
Two of the following: a
positive political climate
regarding the topics of
interest to the Presidency,
absence of domestic events
in EU countries or global
developments that divert
attention from the topics of
interest to the Presidency,
and/or absence of
unexpected events or crises
A positive political climate
regarding the topics of
interest to the Presidency,
absence of domestic
events in EU countries or
global developments that
divert attention from the
topics of interest to the
Presidency, and absence
of unexpected events or
crises
Economic
prosperity
Economic stagnation or
decline in at least one EU
Member State and a general
climate of economic crisis
Economic growth of up to 0.5
per cent in all EU Member
States but a general climate
of economic crisis
Economic growth of up to 0.5
per cent in all EU Member
States and economic
optimism
Economic growth of more
than 0.5 per cent in all EU
Member States
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discussed as part of the reputation of a country, but in conjunction with salience of policy areas (see infra). Soft
knowledge, by contrast, concerns ‘how’ and ‘who’ questions and stimulates a constructive atmosphere. It is effec-
tive in a negative rather than a positive way: smooth management of negotiations does as such not yield positive
results, but poor management gives rise to irritation and mistrust (Vanhoonacker et al., 2010). The latter aspect of
soft knowledge – networking (including formal and informal coordination with other Member States and the EU
institutions) – has been discussed by some authors (Bjurulf, 2001; Bunse, 2009; Kajnc,̌ 2009; Karoliewski & Sus,
2011), without explicitly linking this to the reputation of the incumbent. In this research, however, we do consider
networking as part of soft knowledge and thus of reputation, since the skills for alliance building are similar to the
other soft skills. In sum, ‘good reputation’ is operationalized as follows: 0.00 = none of the following: ‘right
example’ at home, the Government has a positive attitude to European integration, the Presidency invests in
soft knowledge of chairpersons; 0.33 = one of the aforementioned; 0.67 = two of the aforementioned; 1.00 = all
components of a good reputation.
There are many ways8 of operationalizing the size of a country, which is also one of the conditions for Presi-
dency influence. In this article, population is taken as the indicator of a Member State’s size.9 ‘Large country’ is
operationalized in relation to the average population of EUMember States (approximately 18/507 million): 0.00 =
less than half the average (less than 9 million), 0.33 = more than 9 million and less than 18 million, 0.67 = between
the average and twice the average (from 18 to 36 million), 1.00 = more than twice the average (more than 36
million).
The operationalization of ‘stable domestic political and administrative context’ is 0.00 = none of the following:
efficient coordination between and within State services, strong parliamentary support for the Government, no
national or important regional elections during the Presidency period; 0.33 = one of the aforementioned; 0.67 =
two of the aforementioned; 1.00 = all components of a stable domestic political and administrative context.
As outlined supra, salience of a policy area to the Presidency is strongly related to hard knowledge. High sal-
ience generally motivates the development of a high level of hard knowledge of a country’s civil servants and
politicians, and vice versa (Schalk et al., 2007; Warntjen, 2007). In this article, salience therefore includes hard
knowledge. ‘High salience to the Presidency’ is operationalized as follows: 0.00 = the issue is not explicitly men-
tioned in the Presidency programme, and interviewees and secondary sources reveal that the issue is not important
to the Presidency; 0.33 = the issue is explicitly mentioned in the Presidency programme, but interviewees and sec-
ondary sources reveal that the issue is not important to the Presidency; 0.67 = the issue is not explicitly mentioned
in the Presidency programme, but interviewees and secondary sources reveal that the issue is important to the Pre-
sidency; 1.00 = the issue is explicitly mentioned in the priority programme (for unexpected events this criterion is
dropped), and interviewees and secondary sources reveal that the issue is important to the Presidency. Salience to
the Presidency is grouped per policy area in the same way as PI per policy area: the maximum score of salience for
all outputs in the policy area is taken as the membership score for the whole policy area. If, for example, one issue
in the area of trade with the EaP countries is highly salient to the Presidency (1.00), salience of ‘trade/economic
relations’ is scored as 1.00 too. Detailed information on operationalization of salience is provided in the online
country files (see Supplemental data 1–3 online).
Our operationalization of salience to the Presidency differs from those that were put forward by other
authors. In some studies (see, e.g. Thomson & Stokman, 2006; Schalk et al., 2007), ‘salience’ is seen as
the proportion of an actor’s potential capabilities it is willing to mobilize in order to influence outcomes,
or the extent to which actors experience utility loss from outcomes that differ from the one that it most
favoured. The importance of an issue is measured here through expert judgements that provide a score on
a scale of 0–100. Warntjen (2007), in turn, uses the election programmes of the parties in the Government
as a proxy for salience, cross-validated with the Presidency programme as presented to the European Parlia-
ment. In our view, the operationalization of salience to the Presidency as we present it, is the most suitable to
make the scores applicable in a QCA research design. For a score between 0 and 100, it would be difficult to
establish a threshold when an issue is or is not salient. In addition, for EaP policies, it would not be sufficient
to base the membership score (only) on party/Presidency programmes or expert judgements. In order to take
strategic prioritization and salience of unexpected events into account, a combination of the two is necessary.
A ‘favourable distribution of preferences and salience among other actors’ is operationalized as follows:
0.00 = the other actors (Member States, institutions) hold homogeneous positions, not corresponding to the Pre-
sidency’s preferences; 0.33 = the other actors hold heterogeneous positions and the policy area is highly salient
to them; 0.67 = the other actors hold heterogeneous positions and the policy area is of low salience to them;
1.00 = the other actors hold homogeneous positions, corresponding to the Presidency’s preferences. As
explained supra, the points of view on the intensity, scope, underlying principles and finality of EU-EaP
cooperation greatly diverge among Member States and EU institutions. Some view the EaP initiative as a
24 B. Vandecasteele et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ru
no
 V
an
de
ca
ste
ele
] a
t 1
2:0
3 2
2 M
ay
 20
15
 
stepping stone for further enlargement of the EU, while others consider it an alternative. Hungary, Poland and
Lithuania belong to the former group. The EU institutions were generally supportive of the activities of these
three Presidencies with regard to the EaP (Interview 10, 11): especially European Commission officials sig-
nalled that they see it as an advantage when ‘their’ policy areas are promoted at the political level (Interview
6, 7, 8, 9).
For a ‘favourable external political context’, 0.00 = none of the following: a positive political climate
regarding the topics of interest to the Presidency, absence of domestic events in EU countries or global devel-
opments that divert attention from the topics of interest to the Presidency, and absence of unexpected events or
crises; 0.33 = one of the aforementioned; 0.67 = two of the aforementioned; 1.00 = all aforementioned
components.
Economic prosperity can be hardly captured in one number. For reasons of simplicity and comparability, we
use the growth rate and the general economic climate as proxies for ‘economic prosperity’ and thus operationalize
this condition as follows: 0.00 = economic stagnation or decline in at least one EU Member State and a general
climate of economic crisis; 0.33 = economic growth of up to 0.5 per cent in all EU Member States, but a
general climate of economic crisis; 0.67 = economic growth of up to 0.5 per cent in all EU Member States and
economic optimism; 1.00 = economic growth of more than 0.5 per cent in all EU Member States.
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